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Abstract
While the participation decision is discrete in a static context, i.e. to work
or not to work, such is not the case in a life-cycle context where workers choose
the fraction of their lifetime that they spend working. In this paper, I therefore
characterize the optimal redistribution policy in a life-cycle framework with both
an intensive and an extensive margin of labor supply. The government should
optimally design a history-dependent social security system which induces higher
productivity individuals to retire later. Some redistribution therefore needs to be
done through the pension system; a standard non-linear income tax is not enough.
Keywords: Extensive margin, Optimal redistribution, Retirement age, Social
security
JEL Classication: E62, H21, H55, J26
1 Introduction
Any redistribution policy should provide resources to the poor while preserving incentives
to work for higher productivity workers. Thus, to characterize the optimal trade-o¤
between equity and e¢ ciency, it is crucial to rely on a good model of the labor supply.
In particular, it is now widely recognized that workers respond to incentives along two
I am grateful to Nicholas Barr, Tim Besley, Richard Blundell, Alessandra Casarico, Raj Chetty,
Melvyn Coles, Wouter Den Haan, Giulio Fella, Henrik Kleven, Guy Laroque, Etienne Lehmann, Erzo
F.P. Luttmer, James Mirrlees, Thomas Piketty, Johannes Spinnewijn and to seminar participants at the
London School of Economics, the Paris School of Economics, the Institute for Fiscal Studies (London,
UK), the Journées Louis-André Gérard-Varet 2009 (Marseilles, France), the Royal Economic Society
Annual Conference 2010 (University of Surrey, UK) and the Econometric Society World Congress 2010
(Shanghai, China) for useful comments and suggestions. A previous version of this paper, from March
2009, was circulated under the title "Dynamic Optimal Redistributive Taxation with Endogenous Re-
tirement". Contact: Jean-Baptiste.Michau@polytechnique.edu
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margins: an intensive and an extensive margin. The intensive margin determines the
number of hours, or the intensity, of work of participating workers. The extensive margin,
due to the existence of xed costs of working, determines whether individuals choose to
participate or not.
While in a static setup, the participation choice is inherently discrete, i.e. to work or
not to work, such is not the case in a life-cycle framework where agents choose the frac-
tion of their lifetime that they spend working or, equivalently, their retirement age. This
di¤erence is due to the fact that xed costs of working introduce a non-convexity into
workerslabor supply problem which, in the absence of employment lotteries, can only be
convexied over time by alternating spells of employment and leisure. Hence, acknowl-
edging the life-cycle nature of workers labor supply problem considerably strengthens
Vickreys (1939) case1 for adopting a life-cycle perspective on the optimal redistribution
problem.
In this paper, I therefore characterize the optimal redistribution policy in a life-cycle
framework where workers are heterogeneous in productivity. I allow for two dimensions to
labor supply: the number of hours of work conditional on participation, i.e. the intensive
margin, and the retirement age, i.e. the extensive margin. I rst rely on the revelation
principle to determine the optimal incentive-feasible allocation of resources. I then turn
to the implementation of the optimum in a decentralized economy. Finally, I calibrate
the model in order to illustrate numerically the key features of the optimal policy.
The main policy recommendations are as follows. Higher productivity workers should
have longer careers. Hence, the retirement age should be a key input of the scal system
which, naturally, takes the form of a history-dependent social security system. In fact, the
optimal allocation cannot be implemented by a standard history-independent nonlinear
income tax alone. This implies that some redistribution needs to be done within the
pension system. While this is already the case in practice, there has, so far, been little
theoretical justication for seeing social security as more than a savings device.
1.1 Related Literature
Mirrlees (1971) solved the optimal redistribution problem in a static environment with an
intensive margin only. More recently, the consequences of adding an extensive margin to
that framework have been analyzed rather extensively (see, for instance, Diamond 1980,
Saez 2002, Immervoll Kleven Kreiner Saez 2007, Chone Laroque 2005, 2011, Laroque
2005, Beaudry Blackorby Szalay 2009, Brewer Saez Shephard 2010, Blundell Shephard
1Vickreys concern was that, for a given lifetime income, taxation should be neutral with respect to
the point in time when income is realized. In an empirical investigation of this proposal, Liebmen (2002)
showed that basing taxation on lifetime, rather than annual, income can reduce the deadweight loss of
taxation by up to 11 percent.
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2011). Importantly, this literature has provided some support for the implementation
of a tax credit, such as the Earned Income Tax Credit in the US, which reduces the
labor supply distortions induced by redistribution. However, abstracting from the life-
cycle dimension of workerslabor supply problem is more than a simplifying assumption.
Indeed, it fundamentally changes the nature of the participation decision by making it
discrete.
The issue of the optimal design of a social security system with heterogeneous agents
and endogenous retirement has, so far, been largely overlooked. Two important excep-
tions include the pioneering work of Diamond (2003, chapter 6) and of Sheshinski (2008).
In both cases, agents are heterogeneous in their xed disutility cost of working rather
than in their productivity. The main nding is that agents with a low xed cost retire
later than others and some of the income generated by their extra activity is redistributed
to those having a high xed cost. However, in both cases, the result is derived within
a three period model, not suitable for a quantitative exercise, and the authors do not
describe how the optimal allocation could be implemented in a decentralized economy.
Cremer, Lozachmeur and Pestieau (2004) also look at optimal social security with
endogenous retirement. Workers can only be of two or three types which di¤er in produc-
tivity and in disutility of labor. They show that the retirement age is distorted downward
for everybody except for workers with the highest productivity and lowest disutility of
labor.
Laroque (2009) determines the optimal taxation of income in a life-cycle model with
an extensive margin only. He obtains the same labor income tax schedule as in a corre-
sponding static analysis, except that the social weights should depend on lifetime, rather
than current, income. However, a crucial di¤erence with the approach of this paper is
that he does not assume a xed utility cost of working but, instead, a xed productiv-
ity cost of working. This implies that, even in a life-cycle framework, the participation
decision remains discrete, i.e. a worker participates at a given age if and only if his
productivity net of the xed cost at that age is positive. In other words, the xed cost
does not introduce a non-convexity into workerslabor supply problem which would have
induced them to choose to work for a fraction of their lives.2
While I focus on redistribution, some work has been done on the optimal nancing
of an exogenous stream of government expenditures in a life-cycle context. Erosa and
Gervais (2002) restrict their analysis to linear taxes and show that, if labor income taxes
could not be decreasing with age, then taxing capital is a desirable, albeit imperfect,
substitute. Gorry and Obereld (2010) solve for the optimal taxation of a single agent
who has both an intensive and an extensive labor supply margin (the latter induces him
2In the words of Ljungqvist and Sargent (2006), Laroque (2009) does not have a "time averaging"
model of the labor supply.
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to choose to participate for a fraction of his life). Importantly, the only scal instrument
allowed is a standard history-independent non-linear income tax. Hence, the policy which
they derive is only constrained optimal, which explains why the "no distortion at the top"
principle does not hold in their context.
Finally, there has recently been major developments in dynamic optimal taxation
with heterogeneous agents (see Kocherlakota 2010 for a comprehensive survey). While
this literature builds on Mirrlees (1971), its main focus has not been on redistribution
policies but, instead, on the optimal provision of insurance against skill risks. The main
corresponding results are about savings distortions, not about the optimal allocation of
time between work and leisure, which seems paradoxical given the central importance of
labor income taxes in the static optimal taxation literature. Quantitative analyses of labor
supply distortions have nevertheless been performed under some special circumstances.
For instance, Albanesi Sleet (2006) assumes independently and identically distributed
productivity shocks, in Farhi Werning (2010) productivity follows an AR(1) process,
Diamond Mirrlees (1978), Golosov Tsyvinski (2006) and Denk Michau (2010) only allow
for permanent disability shocks, Golosov Troshkin Tsyvinski (2010) and Weinzierl (2011)
focus on two or three period models and Kapicka (2008) does not allow for savings. My
paper complements this literature by determining the optimal labor supply distortions in
a life-cycle context without uncertainty.
Some of the most important results of this New Dynamic Public Finance literature are
about the implementation of optimal allocations in decentralized economies. In particu-
lar, Grochulski and Kocherlakota (2010) have shown, in a very general context, that the
implementation problem could be solved with a history-dependent social security system.
My presentation of the optimal pension system builds on some of their insights.
I begin by presenting, in section 2, the structure of the economy and the corresponding
labor supply model. The optimal incentive-feasible allocation of resources is derived in
section 3. I then characterize in section 4 a history-dependent social security system which
implements the optimum in a decentralized economy. Section 5 contains a numerical
simulation of the optimal policy. This paper ends with a conclusion.
2 Model
Individuals face a deterministic life-span equal to H. Utility is additively separable
between consumption and leisure. Agents derive an instantaneous utility u(ct) from
consuming ct at age t, where u0(:) > 0, u00(:) < 0, lim
c!0+
u(c) =  1 and lim
c!0+
u0(c) = +1.
They work from age 0 until a retirement age R and get disutility v(lt) from supplying
lt units of labor at age t, where v(0) = 0, v0(0) = 0, v0(:)  0 and v00(:) > 0. They
also have to incur a xed cost of working b > 0 which, for simplicity, is assumed to be
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independent of age. Lifetime utility V is time separable and the future is discounted at
rate . Individuals therefore have the following preferences:
V =
Z H
0
e tu(ct)dt 
Z R
0
e t [v(lt) + b] dt: (1)
Note that the value of leisure is normalized to zero when individuals are not working,
i.e. from age R to H. The continuous time specication makes it possible to rely on a
rst-order condition to determine the retirement age R.
The lifetime utility function (1) entails both an intensive and an extensive margin of
labor supply. Clearly, conditional on working, agents need to choose a number of hours,
or an intensity, lt of work; this is the intensive margin. As the disutility cost of working
v(:) is increasing and convex, in the absence of a xed cost b > 0 of working, agents would
choose to work until the end of their lives, i.e. R = H. However, the xed cost creates
an indivisibility which induces agents to choose to work for only a fraction R=H of their
lives; this is the extensive margin.
Each agent is characterized by a productivity index  and faces a deterministic pro-
ductivity prole ft()gt2[0;H]. Thus, an -worker produces output t() if he supplies
one unit of labor at age t. Productivity t() is di¤erentiable in both  and t. As will be-
come clear, I need to assume that productivity t() at each age t is weakly increasing in
the productivity parameter  of the agent. More formally,  > 0 implies t()  t(0)
for all t with a strict inequality for at least one t.3 Thus, the deterministic productivity
proles of two agents are not allowed to cross at any point in time. The distribution of the
productivity index  across the population is given by the p.d.f. f(:) with support [0; ],
where the lower bound of this support is normalized to 0.4 Resources can be transferred
across time at an exogenous interest rate which, for simplicity, is assumed to be equal to
the discount rate .
The above specication assumes that agents choose to work at the beginning of their
lives, from age 0 to R, and to retire at the end, from R toH. In fact, with a constant xed
cost of working and an interest rate equal to the discount rate, the timing of participation
is fully determined by workersproductivity prole: workers want to participate when
their productivity is highest. Thus, if productivity proles follow an inverted U-shape,
then agents should choose to enjoy some leisure at the beginning of their lives while
3A natural candidate specication, which I subsequently use to calibrate the model, is to have a
baseline productivity prole t, common to all workers, multiplied by the individual-specic productivity
index , i.e. t() = t.
4Alternatively, I could have assumed that all agents share the same productivity prole but have
heterogeneous xed costs of working. However, simultaneously allowing for both sources of heterogeneity
would lead to a mutli-dimensional screening problem which would not simplify as much here as in a static
context since, in a life-cycle framework, it is not possible to summarize workersparticipation decision
by comparing their xed cost of working to a productivity-specic threshold.
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their productivity is still low, as in Rogerson Wallenius (2009). However, note that rising
productivity at early ages is likely to be due to on-the-job learning e¤ects, which, if
properly taken into account, would not lead agents to postpone their age of entry into
the labor force. Thus, for simplicity, I shall consider throughout that agents have non-
increasing productivity proles, which is consistent with (1).5 Interestingly, with constant
productivity, the timing of participation is indeterminate provided that the present value
of income6 remains unchanged.
A recent literature in macro-labor has emphasized the relevance of the above life-
cycle model of the labor supply (see Mulligan 2001, Ljungqvist Sargent 2006, 2008,
2010, Prescott Rogerson Wallenius 2009, Rogerson Wallenius 2009). Crucially, a xed
cost of working creates a non-convexity into workerslabor supply problem. According
to Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988), workers convexify their problem by relying on
employment lotteries together with a complete set of nancial markets which provides
insurance against the outcome of the lotteries. However, in many applications with a
participation margin, the non-convexity problem has been ignored on the basis of the
fact that most workers do not have access to such lotteries. Recently, Mulligan (2001)
and Ljungqvist Sargent (2006) have emphasized that an alternative way for workers to
convexify their labor supply problem is to alternate spells of employment and leisure
while relying on a risk-free asset to smooth their consumption over time.7 More precisely,
Ljungqvist and Sargent (2006) have shown that, in continuous time, lotteries and time
averaging models of indivisible labor are equivalent when productivity is constant and
quantitatively very similar otherwise.
According to Ljungqvist and Sargent (2010), these developments have led to the
emergence of a new paradigm according to which workers labor supply should be an-
alyzed within a life-cycle framework where the key object of inquiry is workerschoice
of career length. Interestingly, in their analysis of extensive margin elasticities, Chetty,
Guren, Manoli and Weber (2011) have shown that a time averaging model à la Rogerson
Wallenius (2009) generates an empirically plausible Hicksian extensive elasticity of labor
supply.
To complete the exposition of the economy, I need to specify its information struc-
5However, allowing for inverted U-shaped productivity proles, which induce agents to enjoy some
leisure at the beginning of their lives, would not fundamentally change my results. Indeed, if the pro-
ductivity of all agents is proportional to a baseline productivity prole, i.e. t() = t, then, in the
absence of discounting, i.e.  = r = 0, assuming a non-increasing productivity prole is without loss
of generality if the index t ranks time by productivities (in descending order) rather then by ages (in
ascending order).
6Strictly speaking, it is only with no discounting,  = r = 0, that this present value is entirely
determined by the fraction of time spent working.
7Interestingly, even though they were not aware of these controversies, Diamond and Mirrlees (1978)
already relied on such a time averaging model of the labor supply to analyze the optimal provision of
social insurance against the disability risk.
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ture. The planner observes output yt produced at each instant but does not observe the
corresponding labor supply lt; the two being related by yt = t()lt for an -worker.
Instantaneous consumption ct is also observable, which is equivalent to assuming that
savings could be monitored and, hence, taxed. Finally, the planner knows the retirement
age R of each agent.8 Full commitment is assumed.
Importantly, this setup could be seen as being embedded in an overlapping generations
framework. However, throughout my analysis I exclusively focus on redistribution within,
and not across, generations. Hence, as I only focus on a single cohort, I do not need to
specify the full overlapping generations structure of the economy; all I need to know is
the interest rate at which physical resources are transferred across time.9 Recall that, for
simplicity, I exogenously assume that this interest rate is equal to the discount rate .
Thus, the cohort under investigation throughout my analysis could be seen as living on
an isolated island which has the possibility to borrow and lend to the rest of the world
at rate .
3 Optimal allocation
This section relies on the revelation principle to determine the optimal allocation of
resources, while the next section turns to the implementation of the optimal policy in a
decentralized economy. Thus, for now, the planners problem is to determine the best
allocation implementable by a direct truthful mechanism whereby each agent is asked to
report his type  and where telling the truth is individually rational.
A worker claiming to be of type  receives a consumption stream fct()gt2[0;H], is
required to work until age R() and needs to produce a ow of output fyt()gt2[0;R())
while working. Note that, if workers truthfully reveal their type , then these functions
jointly characterize the allocation of resources. I shall assume throughout that, for any t,
ct(), yt() and R() are all continuously di¤erentiable in . The welfare of an -worker
claiming to be of type 0 is given by:
V (0;) =
Z H
0
e tu(ct(0))dt 
Z R(0)
0
e t

v

yt(
0)
t()

+ b

dt; (2)
8The assumption that labor supply is observable along the extensive margin but not along the intensive
margin is problematic if agents have the possibility to alternate spells of employment and leisure at a
very high frequency. Thus, following Mulligan (2001), we implicitly assume that there is a maximum
frequency at which agents can switch between work and leisure and that "the [resulting] indivisibility
is at least as long as the tax accounting period".
9Note that, fully specifying the overlapping generations structure of the economy would make it
possible to endogenize the interest rate. For instance, this would reveal that, under a fully-funded
social security system, the interest rate is equal to the rate of return on physical capital while, under
a pay-as-you-go system, the interest rate is determined by the rate of growth of the population and of
output.
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where I have used the fact that an -worker needs to supply yt(0)=t() units of labor
to produce output yt(0) at age t. Let V () denote the lifetime utility of an -worker
who is telling the truth, i.e. V ()  V (;). We have:
V () =
Z H
0
e tu(ct())dt 
Z R()
0
e t [v (lt()) + b] dt; (3)
where lt() = yt()=t().
By the revelation principle, any incentive-feasible allocation of resources is imple-
mentable by a direct truthful mechanism. It must therefore satisfy the following incentive
compatibility constraints:
V (;)  V (0;), for all  and 0: (4)
An incentive-feasible allocation must also satisfy the economy-wide resource constraint:
Z 
0
"Z R()
0
e tt()lt()dt 
Z H
0
e tct()dt
#
f()d  E; (5)
where E denotes an exogenous amount of government expenditures that must be nanced.
The bracketed term on the left-hand-side corresponds to the present value of the lifetime
budgetary surplus generated by an -worker.
Finally, the planners objective is to maximize social welfare, expressed as a Bergson-
Samuelson functional: Z 
0
	(V ()) f()d; (6)
where 	(:) is an increasing and weakly concave function weighting the lifetime utility
of individuals according to the redistributive objective. Following Tuomala (1990) and
Blundell Shephard (2011), a natural specication of 	(:), given that V (:) can be negative,
is:
	(V ) =
1  e V

; (7)
where  2 [0;+1) is the coe¢ cient of absolute inequality aversion, i.e.  =  	00(:)=	0(:).
The two most common benchmarks are the utilitarian social preferences,  = 0, where
the planner only cares about the sum of individual utilities without any special concerns
about their distribution across the population and the Rawlsian case,  = +1, where
the welfare of society is exclusively determined by the utility of the worst-o¤ individual.
The planners problem is to maximize social welfare (6) subject to the resource con-
straint (5) and to the incentive compatibility constraints (4).
To solve this problem, it is now necessary to express the incentive compatibility con-
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straints in a more manageable form. In particular, note that these constraints require
that, for any given , V (0;) must be maximized when 0 = . Thus, a necessary
rst-order condition for incentive compatibility is:10
V1(; ) = 0, for all : (8)
By denition, V 0() = V1(;) + V2(;). Thus, this necessary rst-order condition for
incentive compatibility could be written as:
V 0() = V2(;)
=
Z R()
0
e tlt()v0(lt())
0t()
t()
dt; (9)
where the second line was obtained by di¤erentiating V (;), given by (2), with respect
to its second argument.11
In order to be able to replace the doubly innite number of incentive compatibility
constraints in (4) by the rst-order condition (9), it is essential that this rst-order
condition does characterize a global maximum.
Lemma 1 A su¢ cient condition for the rst-order condition (8) or (9) to characterize
a global maximum is
dyt()
d
 0 for all t 2 [0; R()) and dR()
d
 0. (10)
Proof. Using the fact that the rst-order condition implies that V1(0; 0) = 0 for any
0, we have:
V1(
0; ) = V1(0; )  V1(0; 0)
=
Z R(0)
0
e t

1
t(
0)
v0

yt(
0)
t(
0)

  1
t()
v0

yt(
0)
t()

dyt(
0)
d0
dt
+e R(
0)
"
v
 
yR(0)(
0)
R(0)(
0)
!
  v
 
yR(0)(
0)
R(0)()
!#
dR(0)
d0
: (11)
The disutility v(:) of labor being increasing and convex in the amount of labor supplied,
v(x) and xv0(x) are both increasing in x.12 Also, remember that 0 >  implies t(
0) 
t(): Hence, the two bracketed terms in (11) have the same sign as (   0) whenever
10Vi(
0;) denotes the derivative of V (:; :) with respect to its ith argument.
11Note that 0t() = dt()=d.
12This implies that the Spence-Mirrlees condition is satised. In a static optimal taxation framework,
this condition ensures that the rst-order condition together with a requirement that output is a non-
decreasing function of productivity are necessary and su¢ cient for incentive compatibility. Here, due
9
t(
0) 6= t() and are otherwise equal to zero. Thus, dyt()=d  0 for all t 2 [0; R())
and dR()=d  0 implies that V1(0;)  0 for 0 <  and V1(0;)  0 for 0 > ,
which guarantees that the rst order condition (8) does characterize a global maximum.
Note that, to prove Lemma 1, I had to use the assumption that the productivity proles
of di¤erent workers never cross. Indeed, when replacing the multiple inequalities in (4)
by a rst-order condition, I am implicitly using the fact that it is only the downward
incentive compatibility constraints which are binding, i.e. workers must be prevented
from reporting a slightly lower productivity than they truly have. Fundamentally, this
structure is due to redistribution going from high to low productivity agents; but with
crossing proles is not clear who should benet and who should lose from redistribution
and, hence, it is generically not possible to have a rst-order approach to the incentive
compatibility problem.
Lemma 1 implies that, in the planners optimization problem, the daunting incentive
compatibility constraints (4) could be replaced by the much simpler rst-order condition
(9) provided that the resulting allocation of resources does satisfy (10). This gives an
optimal control problem with ct(), lt() and R() as control variables and V () as the
state variable, where we must impose that these variables are related by (3).
Let  > 0 denote the multiplier for the resource constraint and () the multiplier
for the incentive compatibility constraint of the -worker.
Lemma 2 The solution to the planners problem is characterized by the following opti-
mality conditions for consumption:
ct() = c(); (12)
for labor supply along the intensive margin:


t() 
v0(lt())
u0(c())

f() + ()
0t()
t()
[v0(lt()) + lt()v00(lt())] = 0; (13)
and for labor supply along the extensive margin:


R()()lR()() 
v(lR()()) + b
u0(c())

f()+()
0R()()
R()()
lR()()v
0(lR()())  0, (14)
which is binding whenever R() > 0;13 where the multipliers () and  are implicitly
to the multidimensional nature of labor supply, the Spence-Mirrlees condition only makes it possible to
nd a su¢ cient condition for the rst-order condition to characterize an incentive compatible allocation
of resources.
13If the constraint R()  H is binding, then (14) must be satised with the reverse inequality, i.e.
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determined by:
 0() =

	0(V ())  
u0(c())

f() with (0) = () = 0. (15)
Proof. Let () denote the multiplier for equation (3) which relates the state variable
V () to the control variables ct(), lt() and R(). The Hamiltonian is:
H = 	(V ())f() + 
"Z R()
0
e tt()lt()dt 
Z H
0
e tct()dt  E
#
f()
+()
Z R()
0
e tlt()v0(lt())
0t()
t()
dt (16)
+()
"Z H
0
e tu(ct())dt 
Z R()
0
e t [v (lt()) + b] dt  V ()
#
.
According to Pontryagins maximum principle, the control variables must be chosen such
as to maximize the Hamiltonian. Importantly, note that none of the control variables can
be negative.
The rst-order condition for consumption is:14
@H
@ct()
=  e tf() + ()e tu0(ct()) = 0. (17)
This implies (12) together with:
() =
f()
u0(c())
. (18)
Optimal labor supply along the intensive margin is determined by:
@H
@lt()
= e tt()f() (19)
+()e t [v0(lt()) + lt()v00(lt())]
0t()
t()
  ()e tv0 (lt())  0,
which is binding whenever lt() > 0. Note that, if the inequality is strict, then we must
have lt() = 0. But, since v(0) = v0(0) = 0, this would imply e tt()f() < 0, which
is not possible. Thus, (19) is always binding. Combining this expression with (18) yields
with the left hand side greater or equal to zero. However, assuming that b is su¢ ciently high or that
H() is su¢ ciently low guarantees that even the most productive worker chooses to retire before the
end of his life.
14I ignore the non-negativity constraint for consumption which cannot be binding since, by assumption,
lim
c!0+
u0(c) = +1.
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(13). The rst-order condition for the extensive margin is:
@H
@R()
= e R()R()()lR()()f() (20)
+()e R()lR()()v0(lR()())
0R()()
R()()
  ()e R() v  lR()()+ b  0,
which is binding whenever R() > 0. Combining this expression with (18) yields (14).
Finally, we must have:
@H
@V ()
= 	0(V ())f()  () =  0() (21)
together with the transversality conditions:
(0) = () = 0. (22)
Substituting (18) into (21) yields (15).
A notable feature of the solution to the planners problem is that consumption should
remain constant throughout the life of an individual. In fact, in the absence of uncertainty
and with the interest rate equal to the discount rate, this result is not very surprising
since there is nothing to be gained by distorting an individuals lifetime allocation of
consumption.
It is now possible to solve for the optimal allocation of resources.
Proposition 1 The optimal incentive-feasible allocation of resources
n
R(); fyt ()gt2[0;R()) ;
fct ()gt2[0;H]
o
2[0;]
is characterized by the planners optimality conditions (12), (13),
(14) and (15) together with the constraints of the planners problem (5), (9) and (3),
provided that this allocation15 satises the su¢ cient condition (10).
It is important to emphasize that the above resolution of the problem allows for bunching
due to binding non-negativity constraints on the control variables, i.e. bunching at the
bottom of the skill distribution.16 However, by considering that the su¢ cient condition
(10) holds, I am ruling out the possibility of bunching due to the failure of the rst-
order approach to the planners problem. This type of bunching would be much more
problematic here than in a static optimal taxation problem given that the su¢ cient
15The planners optimality conditions are only necessary. Hence, if the system of equations yields more
than one solution, then it is the solution that generates the highest level of social welfare which needs to
satisfy the su¢ cient condition (10).
16As shown in the proof of Lemma 2, it is only the non-negativity constraint on the retirement age
R() which could ever be binding.
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condition (10) of Lemma 1 is not necessary for the rst-order condition (9) to characterize
a global maximum. In other words, imposing this su¢ cient condition together with the
rst-order condition would be more restrictive than imposing incentive compatibility.
Let  i(; t) denote the wedge along the intensive margin for an -worker of age t,
which is implicitly dened by:
t()
 
1   i(; t) = v0(lt())
u0(c())
: (23)
Similarly, the extensive wedge  e() for an -worker is dened by:
R()()lR()() (1   e()) =
v(lR()()) + b
u0(c())
: (24)
These two equations state that, absent any distortions, i.e.  i(; t) = 0 and  e() =
0, the marginal product of labor should be equal to the marginal rate of substitution
between leisure and consumption where, for the extensive margin, the disutility from
retiring marginally later is v(lR()()) + b and the corresponding marginal product is
R()()lR()(). Simple algebra using the optimality conditions for the intensive (13)
and extensive (14) margins, respectively, reveals that:
 i(; t) =   ()
f()
0t()
[t()]
2 [v
0(lt()) + lt()v00(lt())] ; (25)
and:
 e()    ()
f()
0R()()
R()()
2v0(lR()()); (26)
with an equality whenever R() > 0. As () = 0, the no distortion at the top principle
holds along both margins. The following Lemma is proved in Appendix A.
Lemma 3 If the su¢ cient condition (10) of Lemma 1 holds and if there exists a t 2
[0; R()) such that t() < t() for all  < 
17, then () < 0 for all  2 (0; ).
It follows from this Lemma together with (25) and (26) that the wedge is strictly positive
along both margins for any  2 (0; ) provided that the corresponding -workers do
participate.
Before turning to the following section, note that in the absence of an intensive margin,
i.e. with v(:) = 0, the current model could almost be seen as a life-cycle interpretation of
the static Mirrlees (1971) optimal taxation problem where R() is the labor supply of the
-worker. There is, however, one crucial di¤erence which is that here the retirement age is
17This very mild assumption ensures that an -worker with  <  is not de facto identical to an
-worker (as would be the case if they only di¤ered in productivity while not working).
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observable, while in Mirrlees (1971) labor supply is not directly observable. This implies
that, in the current framework with v(:) = 0, the incentive compatibility constraint (9)
reduces to V 0() = 0, i.e. all agents end up with identical welfare regardless of the social
preferences captured by 	(:).18
Thus, with an extensive margin only, all agents end up with an identical level of welfare
and, hence, high productivity agents do not need to be provided with an informational
rent in order to produce a high level of output. This explains why, with v(:) = 0, the
choice of the retirement age is undistorted, i.e.  e() = 0 for any value of . It follows
that, in the general model with both margins, the strictly positive extensive wedge is
due to the existence of the intensive margin. Indeed, when V 0() > 0, distortions are
necessary to induce people to reveal their type and it is preferable to have two small
distortions rather than a single large one.
4 Implementation in a decentralized economy
Now that I have characterized the optimal allocation of resources, I turn to the description
of how the government could implement this allocation in a decentralized economy by
relying on realistic scal instruments (rather than on a direct truthful mechanism).19
Recall that consumption should optimally be constant throughout the life of an in-
dividual. This can be achieved by letting agents trade a risk-free asset over time. This
implies that capital taxes are not needed to implement the optimal allocation, which
considerably simplies the problem.
Is it possible to rely exclusively on history-independent income taxes to solve the
implementation problem? It turns out that the answer to this question is no.
Lemma 4 It is, in general, not possible to implement the optimal allocation of resources
with a history-independent, but potentially age-dependent, income tax.
Proof. To prove this statement, it is su¢ cient to nd one example of an allocation
that cannot be implemented with a history-independent income tax. Let us assume that
18Note that, even though the government observes individuals output and labor supply, i.e. their
retirement ages, it does not directly observe their productivity index . Thus, workers can always claim to
have a lower productivity than they truly have by producing ine¢ ciently. Hence, incentive compatibility
trivially requires V 0()  0. By contrast, in a (non-Rawlsian) rst-best allocation of resources, where
the government can observe , higher productivity workers are forced to retire later, without being
compensated by higher consumption, and therefore end up with a lower level of welfare. (With Rawlsian
social preferences, the second-best, i.e. unobservable , and rst-best, i.e. full information, allocations
are identical.)
19Note that, in a static context, once the optimal allocation has been found, it is trivial to determine
the optimal non-linear income tax schedule that implements this allocation in a decentralized economy.
Indeed, if y() and c() denote the output and consumption of an -worker, respectively, then the
income tax T () paid by this -worker is implicitly determined by: T () = y()  c(). As this section
shows, much more work needs to be done in a life-cycle context.
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agents only face an extensive margin of labor supply, i.e. l = 1 and v(1) = 0,20 and that
workers have constant productivity proles with t() = . For simplicity, I also impose
that there is no time discounting, i.e.  = 0, and no exogenous amount of government
expenditures, i.e. E = 0.
By Proposition 1, the optimal allocation of resources is characterized by the optimality
condition:
 =
b
u0(c())
; (27)
the resource constraint: Z 
0
[R()  c()H] f()d = 0; (28)
and the incentive compatibility constraint V 0() = 0.
Let T (; t) be the income tax paid by a worker who produces output  at age t.
Importantly, the resulting income tax schedule is allowed to be age-dependent but not
history-dependent. An -worker therefore faces the following problem:21
max
fR;fctgt2[0;H]g
Z H
0
u(ct)dt 
Z R
0
bdt (29)
subject to
Z R
0
[  T (; t)] dt 
Z H
0
ctdt (30)
This -worker therefore considers that his e¤ective productivity at age t is    T (; t).
But, note that each worker chooses to supply labor when his productivity is highest.
We can therefore impose, without loss of generality, that T (; t) is an non-decreasing
function of t, which guarantees that the worker chooses to work when t 2 [0; R) and to
enjoy leisure when t 2 [R;H].22 The solution to the -workers problem is characterized
by ct = c for all t 2 [0; H], by the optimality condition:
  T (;R) = b
u0(c)
, (31)
and by his binding budget constraint (30). If T (; t) is discontinuous at t = R, then the
20This specication could be seen as resulting from a standard constant intertemporal elasticity of
substitution utility function with zero elasticity, i.e. v(l) = lim
!0+
l1+1==(1+1=), where  is the constant
elasticity parameter.
21I am using the fact that, if the income tax schedule T (:; :) implements the optimal allocation, then
it must induce -workers to produce output  throughout their careers. In other words, the marginal
tax rate cannot exceed 100% at any age.
22Following Rogerson Wallenius (2007), this decreasing productivity prole could be seen as resulting
from a change of variable such as to re-order time from the highest productivity instants to the lowest
productivity instants.
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optimality condition (31) becomes:
lim
"!0+
  T (;R  ")  b
u0(c)
 lim
"!0+
  T (;R + "). (32)
If the income tax schedule T (:; :) implements the optimal allocation, then we must
have, by (27) and (31), T (;R) = 0 or, if T (; t) is discontinuous at t = R, by (27) and
(32), lim
"!0+
T (;R  ")  0. But, as T (; t) is an non-decreasing function of t, this implies
that we must also have T (; t)  0 for all t 2 [0; R). In other words, if T (; t) = 0
when workers are indi¤erent between work and leisure at t = R, then we cannot have
T (; t) > 0 when they strictly prefer to work at any t 2 [0; R).
If T (:; :) implements the optimal allocation, then we can substitute the consumers
budget constraint (30) into the resource constraint (28), which reveals that we must have:
Z 
0
[R()  c()H] f()d =
Z 
0
"Z R()
0
T (; t)dt
#
f()d = 0. (33)
This, together with the requirement that T (; t)  0 for any t 2 [0; R), implies that
T (; t) = 0 for any values of  and t. But, if the government does not intervene, then it
is clear from (29) that higher productivity workers will be better o¤. This violates the
incentive compatibility constraint V 0() = 0.
The intuition for this result is that, when solving for the optimal incentive-feasible alloca-
tion of resources, the planners direct truthful mechanism considers the life-cycle problem
as a whole. It can therefore implicitly rely on its memory to reduce the amount of dis-
tortions needed to raise a given amount of revenue. By contrast, a history-independent
income tax is constrained to create distortions at every single point in time.
To implement the optimal allocation, it is therefore necessary to rely on a scal instru-
ment which is history-dependent until, at least, the retirement age. A natural candidate
is a social security system which, in many countries, already takes into account the history
of participation and of labor income in order to determine the level of pensions.23
Let us now characterize the optimal social security system.24 To lighten notations,
I denote by yR a given history of participation and (gross) labor income, i.e. yR =n
R; fytgt2[0;R)
o
, and by yR() the optimal incentive-feasible history of the -worker, i.e.
yR() =
n
R(); fyt ()gt2[0;R())
o
. I dene DOM as the set of participation and labor
23It should nevertheless be emphasized that, while the optimal allocation of resources is typically
unique, there is usually several ways to implement this allocation in a decentralized economy (the direct
truthful mechanism itself being one way, albeit not very realistic).
24The presentation is closely related to that of Grochulski and Kocherlakota (2010).
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income histories compatible with a socially optimal allocation. More formally:
DOM =

yR : yR = yR() for some  2 [0; ]	 . (34)
Finally, I dene the function c^ : DOM ! R such that:
c^(yR()) = c(). (35)
This function c^(:) must exist. Indeed, if it did not exist, then two agents with the same
history would end up with di¤erent levels of consumption. But, then both agents would
claim to be of the type which yields the highest level of consumption, which would violate
the incentive compatibility constraint (4).25
To make the implementation problem as simple as possible, I now focus on a highly
stylized social security system whereby agents get their lifetime income when they retire.
They do not receive any income at any other point of their lives. Of course, agents can
borrow and lend against this lumpy income such as to smooth their consumption over
time. The social security payment received by workers at retirement is set equal to:
Q(yR) =
(
eR 1 e
 H

c^(yR) if yR 2 DOM
0 otherwise
(36)
Proposition 2 The stylized social security system Q(:) implements the optimal alloca-
tion

yR(); c()
	
2[0;].
Proof. First, adopting a labor supply strategy that generates a history yR outside DOM
cannot be individually rational as the agent would end up with 0 consumption as soon
as he deviates from DOM , which would provide him with a lifetime utility of  1.
Thus, let yR(0) for some 0 2 [0; ] be the history of participation and (gross) labor
income chosen by an -worker. By construction, yR(0) 2 DOM . The -worker will
determine his consumption level by solving:
max
fctgt2[0;H]
Z H
0
e tu(ct)dt 
Z R(0)
0
e t

v

yt (
0)
t()

+ b

dt (37)
subject to e R
(0)Q(yR(0)) 
Z H
0
e tctdt
The agent optimally chooses a constant consumption level c = ct for all t 2 [0; H]. The
25More formally, let ~ 6= ^ with R(~) = R(^) and yt (~) = yt (^) for all t 2 [0; R(~)) but with
c(~) 6= c(^). If c(~) > c(^), then V (~; ^) > V (^; ^); and, if c(~) < c(^), then V (^; ~) > V (~; ~).
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budget constraint therefore simplies to:
c =
e R
(0)
1  e H Q
(yR(0)),
= c^(yR(0)),
= c(0), (38)
where the second line follows from the denition of the social security system Q(:), (36),
and the third line from the denition of c^(:), (35). Thus, if an agent chooses a history
yR(0), then he ends up with a consumption level c(0). It follows that choosing among
yR; c
	
given that yR 2 DOM is equivalent to choosing among reporting strategies in a
direct truthful mechanism. An -worker therefore chooses the history yR() and ends
up with consumption level c().
The stylized social security system Q(:) relies on the full history of participation
and (gross) labor income. It turns out that, in some special cases, it is possible to
implement the optimal allocation by relying exclusively on some key summary statistics,
which greatly simplies the proposed policy. For instance, if workersproductivity prole
is at, then it is possible to have a system that only relies on two variables: the present
value of lifetime (gross) labor income and the retirement age.26 Also, if there is no
intensive margin of labor supply, then the social security payment Q(:) could exclusively
depend on the history of participation, i.e. on the retirement age. However, in the general
case, these simplications are not possible since the time prole of (gross) labor income
does provide some useful information about the workers underlying productivity prole
and, hence, about his productivity index .
I now illustrate the fact that Q(:) could be seen as a reduced form of a more realistic
social security system. Current policies are typically designed such that individuals pay
income taxes throughout their career and receive an annuitized history-dependent pension
after retirement.
Proposition 3 For any income tax function T (:; :), potentially age-dependent, the opti-
mal allocation can be implemented by providing retirees with an annuitized pension P (:),
where:
P (yR) =
(

e R e H
h
1 e H

c^(yR)  R R
0
e t [yt   T (yt; t)] dt
i
if yR 2 DOM
0 otherwise
(39)
26With constant productivity we trivially have, from (13), yt () = y
() for all t 2 [0; R()). Also,
workers spontaneously choose a at labor supply prole in order to reach a desired present value of
lifetime labor income. This implies that the two summary statistics pin down the entire history of
participation and of (gross) labor income.
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Proof. Choosing yR =2 DOM is still not desirable. For yR 2 DOM , the combination of
the income tax schedule T (:; :) and of the annuitized pension payments P (:) satises:Z R
0
e t [yt   T (yt; t)] dt+
Z H
R
e tP (yR)dt = e RQ(yR): (40)
So, the workers budget constraint is not a¤ected by the switch fromQ(:) to fT (:; :); P (:)g
and, hence, fT (:; :); P (:)g also implements the optimal allocation.
Clearly, the proposed policy is not fully identied. In particular, any income tax change
could be o¤set within the social security system such as to leave the resulting allocation
unchanged. It follows that the optimal policy is compatible with any specic recommen-
dations about the shape of the income tax schedule since the e¤ects of any given tax
schedule can be undone after retirement by adjusting the pension payments.
Although it is commonly argued that redistribution should be one of the main ob-
jectives of a well designed pension system (cf., for instance, Barr Diamond 2008), there
is little theoretical justication for this. In particular, it is a priori not clear that an
optimal income tax is not su¢ cient to achieve the desired level of redistribution. Lemma
4 together with Proposition 2 and 3 contribute to this debate by showing that, indeed,
a standard non-linear income tax needs to be supplemented with an optimally designed
social security system which must be sensitive to equity concerns.
I have so far assumed that agents can trade a risk-free asset at the exogenous interest
rate . This implies that, if necessary, they can use their future social security payments
as a collateral in order to be able to borrow enough to smooth their consumption perfectly
over time. If, on the contrary, agents do not have perfect access to the credit market,
then some restrictions on the shape of the income tax T (:; :) must be imposed in order
to implement the optimal allocation with the above social security system.
Proposition 4 If capital markets are dysfunctional and only the government can borrow
and lend at the interest rate , then the unique optimal policy is fT (:; :); P (:)g with the
optimal age-dependent income tax implicitly determined by:
T (yt (); t) = y

t ()  c(): (41)
Proof. By construction, fT (:; :); P (:)g is the only optimal policy such that an -worker
receives net income c() at any point in time. This implies that, even if it was possible,
agents would never want to trade any assets. Note that the optimal income tax function
T (:; :) is well dened provided that dy

t ()
d
> 0, which makes it possible to identify c()
from yt ().
27
27If this condition does not hold and individuals can save but not borrow, then the highest value of
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Thus, even if agents cannot borrow and lend, the government allows them to convexify
their labor supply problem by implementing a policy which still induces them to work
for only a fraction R(:) of their lives.
When thinking about the policy relevance of the proposed social security system, an
important limitation is that we do not know what should be done if agents fail to supply
an optimal amount of labor throughout their career, i.e. if their yR fails to belong to
DOM . Clearly, to address this issue, the present framework would need to be augmented
with features that could explain such outcomes. It could nevertheless be conjectured that,
whether workers fail to choose yR 2 DOM because of skill risks (such as the occurrence
of disability shocks) or because of limited cognitive capacities, the unlikely scenarios and
their corresponding histories should be penalized. Indeed, this would improve incentives
to work at little cost in terms of welfare (since the corresponding scenarios are unlikely to
occur). Determining the robustness of optimal policies to modeling uncertainties remains
an important issue for further research.
5 Simulation
I now simulate the optimal policy for a reasonable calibration of the model. It should
be emphasized that this section relies on the characterization of the optimal allocation
summarized by Proposition 1, not on its implementation in a decentralized economy.
In this section, I rst rely on a simple no-redistribution benchmark to calibrate the
parameters of the model. I then simulate the optimal redistribution policy. Finally,
I decompose the social welfare gains generated by a switch from the no-redistribution
benchmark to the optimal policy.
5.1 A No-Redistribution Benchmark
In this subsection, I focus on the life-cycle problem of a single -worker in the absence
of redistribution. To nance its expenditures, the government imposes on all workers
a proportional labor income tax of rate . Let

~R();
n
~lt()
o
t2[0; ~R())
; f~ct()gt2[0;H]

denote the allocation chosen by an -worker in the no-redistribution benchmark. This
c() compatible with yt () should be used to compute T
(:; :) from (41). If agents can neither save
nor borrow, then the government could ask them to choose a value of c() compatible with yt () and
punish them with zero consumption after retirement if c() is not compatible with their entire history
of participation and labor income.
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allocation solves the following problem:
max
~R();f~lt()g
t2[0;R());f~ct()gt2[0;H]

Z H
0
e tu(~ct())dt 
Z ~R()
0
e t
h
v(~lt()) + b
i
dt (42)
subject to (1  )
Z ~R()
0
e tt()~lt()dt 
Z H
0
e t~ct()dt (43)
It is straightforward to check that the rst-order conditions to the problem are ~ct() =
~c() for all t 2 [0; H] together with:
t() =
v0(~lt())
u0(~c())
and  ~R()()~l ~R()() =
v(~l ~R()()) + b
u0(~c())
. (44)
The tax rate  is set such as to satisfy the government budget constraint:

Z 
0
"Z ~R()
0
e tt()~lt()dt
#
f()d = E. (45)
Individuals can work from age 23 until they die on their 80th birthday, i.e. H = 80 23
(since workers are 23 years old when t = 0). The productivity prole of an -worker
is proportional to a baseline productivity prole t, the proportion being given by his
productivity index :
t() = t. (46)
Figure 1 displays the baseline prole t which is such that productivity is constant and
normalized to 1 until age 60 and then declines linearly until it reaches 0 at 80. This
specication together with the rst-order condition for ~lt, (44), is consistent with the fact
that, empirically, the number of hours worked by participating workers is nearly constant
until age 60 (cf. Blundell Bozio Laroque 2011, Figure 36B and 37B).
The annual discount rate is set equal to 2%, i.e.  = 0:02. The instantaneous utility
derived from consumption is logarithmic:
u(ct) = log(ct): (47)
Importantly, given that preferences are additively separable between consumption and
leisure, this logarithmic specication is necessary and su¢ cient to have the number of
hours worked and the retirement age independent of the productivity index . Indeed,
substituting the specication of productivity (46) and of utility (47) into the rst-order
conditions (44) and into the budget constraint (43) yields ~lt() = ~lt, ~R() = ~R and
~c() = ~c(1). By the same token, the logarithmic specication implies that labor supply
would remain constant in a growing economy, which is empirically reasonable.
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Figure 1: Baseline productivity prole
The disutility from supplying labor along the intensive margin is given by a standard
power function:
v(lt) = k
l
1+ 1

t
1 + 1

; (48)
where  is the constant Frisch intensive elasticity of labor supply. Following Chetty Guren
Manoli Weber (2011), I take  = 0:5. The xed cost b of working and the scale parameter
k in (48) are set such that workers choose to retire at age 65, i.e. ~R = 65   23, and
such that the labor supply of prime age workers is normalized to one, i.e. ~lt = 1 for
t 2 [23  23; 60  23].28 This yields b = 0:526 and k = 1:215.
Interestingly, it can be shown that, with this calibration of the model, the Frisch
extensive elasticity of labor supply is equal to 0.36 while the Hicksian intensive and
extensive elasticities are equal to 0.30 and 0.22, respectively. All these values are very
close to the preferred empirical estimates that Chetty, Guren, Manoli and Weber (2011,
Table 2) derive from their meta-analysis.29 Of course, with logarithmic utility from
consumption, the Marshallian intensive and extensive elasticities are both equal to zero.
The level of government expenditures E is calibrated to amount to a quarter of total
28It can be shown that, in the current context, the e¤ect of k on the variables other than ~lt is identical
to that of a proportional shift, i.e. a rescaling, of the productivity index .
29Their preferred estimates are 0.54 and 0.29 for the Frisch intensive and extensive elasticities and 0.33
and 0.24 for the Hicksian intensive and extensive elasticities, respectively.
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Figure 2: Lognormal distribution of the productivity index 
output. This trivially implies, from the government budget constraint (45), that  = 0:25.
Normalizing the average productivity index  to 1, i.e. E [] = 1, the calibrated model
gives E = 6:998 and E [~c()] = E [~c(1)] = ~c(1) = 0:617. By construction, the average
present value of lifetime consumption,
R H
0
e t~c(1)dt, is equal to [(1  )=]E = 3E =
20:995.
Note that, for workers less than 60 years old, the gross wage and the productivity index
 are identically distributed since t() = t =  when t  60   23. I assume that
both follow a lognormal distribution. While this distribution does not exactly match
the wage distribution, especially for the tails, it seems to be a decent approximation.
Relying on CPS data, Eckstein Nagypal (2004, Table 3) and Heathcote Perri Violante
(2010, Table 4) both nd a standard deviation of log wages in the U.S. in the early 2000s
equal to about 0.65. This implies a coe¢ cient of variation of lognormally distributed
wages equal to
p
e0:652   1 = 0:725. Hence, to simulate the optimal policy, I assume that
the productivity index  is lognormally distributed with a mean of 1 and a standard
deviation of 0.725. The density of this distribution is plotted in Figure 2.30
Now that the theoretical model is fully calibrated, I turn to the simulation of the
30Of course, to the extent that a high wages could reect high e¤orts along the intensive margin, it
would be preferable to rely on the structure of the model and on the current scal system to infer the
skill distribution from the earnings distribution, as in Saez (2001). However, doing so in a life-cycle
context is not straightforward and would probably not be very sensible given the stylized nature of my
model.
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optimal redistribution policy.
5.2 Optimal Redistribution Policy
I now derive the optimal allocation of resources chosen by a utilitarian planner who wants
to maximize the sum of individual lifetime utilities; thus  = 0 in (7). To perform the
simulation, I have relied on a discretized version of the rst-order conditions of Lemma
2 which I have obtained by solving the planners problem under a discrete ability distri-
bution.
Under the optimal redistribution policy, total output is 9.5% lower than under the no-
redistribution benchmark. This implies that public expenditures E now absorb to 27.6%
of total output. Figure 3 displays the lifetime production and consumption of workers as
a function of their productivity index. The least productive 1.3% of the population, those
with  < 0:19, never participate to the labor market. Thanks to redistribution, they can
nevertheless sustain a consumption level equal to 27% of the average consumption level
in the economy. Lifetime consumption exceeds production for 26.0% of workers; those
whose productivity index  falls below 0.53. On the other side of the distribution, the
most productive agents consume at least 58% of their output.
Figure 4 shows the budget surplus raised from each type of worker, i.e. the di¤er-
ence between the lifetime production and consumption of an -worker multiplied by the
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Figure 4: Budget surplus raised from each type of worker
number f() of such workers. This gure illustrates the well-known fact that the bulk
of the nancing of public expenditures and redistribution falls on the upper middle class.
While the rich are, individually, among the largest contributors, they are not su¢ ciently
numerous to be the main source of government revenue. Note that the excess of surpluses
over decits seen on Figure 4 is necessary to nance the government expenditures E.
Figure 5 displays the retirement age of workers as a function of their productivity
index. Career length is increasing in productivity.31 Recall that, in the no-redistribution
benchmark, all workers choose to retire at age 65. It follows that the substantial variation
in retirement ages across workers could be fully attributed to the planners intervention.
Figure 6 shows the distribution of retirement ages across the population. The average
retirement age is 65.05, while its standard deviation across the population is 7.47 years.
There is a mass 1.3% of workers whose productivity is so low that they never participate.
Note that, with v(0) = v0(0) = 0, bunching at the bottom of the distribution would not
occur in the absence of a xed cost b > 0 of working. 5.2% of workers do participate but
retire before age 60.32 74.5% of workers retire between 65 and 69.3, the highest retirement
31Under the current calibration, it turns out that, for very high levels of productivity, the retirement
age is very slightly declining in the productivity index. However, this only a¤ects a small mass of workers.
Also, it could easily be checked numerically that all the incentive compatibility constraints in (4) are
satised, implying that the rst-order approach used to solve the planners problem is indeed valid.
32These workers have constant productivity throughout their career. Hence, instead of working con-
tinuously until retirement, they could choose to alternate spells of employment and leisure provided that
the present value of their production remains unchanged. To implement these alternative allocations,
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Figure 6: Distribution of retirement ages (at age 23, a mass of 1.3% of non-participating workers
is omitted from the graph)
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age. This substantial heterogeneity in career length shows that the retirement age is a key
margin that the government should exploit as part of an optimal redistribution policy.
There is also some variation in labor supply along the intensive margin since higher
productivity agents work longer hours while participating. The least productive workers
who participate, for whom  = 0:19, supply 0.61 units of labor at each instant of their
(innitesimally short) career. The median worker, characterized by  = 0:81, supplies
0.84 units of labor before his productivity starts declining at age 60. Only very high
productivity workers, with  > 4:5, supply more labor along the intensive margin than
in the no-redistribution benchmark (where labor supply before 60 was normalized to 1).
For those who retire after 60, labor supply falls as productivity declines at the end of
their career.33
How do the wedges along the intensive and extensive margins compare? It turns
out that, with a constant Frisch intensive elasticity, as implied by (48), the relationship
between the intensive,  i(; t), and the extensive,  e(), wedge satises:34
 i(; t)
 e()
= 1 +
1

: (49)
Hence, the lower is the elasticity of labor supply along the intensive margin, the higher
should the intensive wedge be relative to the extensive wedge. This is reminiscent of
Ramseys (1927) inverse elasticity rule. In the extreme case where  = 0, all the burden
falls on the intensive margin which, de facto, does not exist as participating workers
always supply exactly one unit of labor.35 More generally, the intensive wedge is always
at least as large as the extensive wedge. This is due to the convexity of the intensive
disutility cost v(:) of working, cf. (25) and (26), which raises the temptation for workers
to underreport their true productivity such as to have to produce a smaller output at
any age. Thus, the incentive compatibility constraint distorts the intensive margin more
than the extensive margin. Figure 7 reports the wedges of participating workers. With
 = 0:5, the intensive wedge is three times larger than the extensive wedge.
the social security system (36) would have to be changed slightly by setting, for instance, age 60 as the
legal retirement age before which no history-dependent transfers could be made.
33It can be shown from (13) that, for any given value of , the ratio [lt()]
1=
=t remains constant for
all values of t 2 [0; R()).
34This immediately follows from the denition of the wedges, (25) and (26), and from the previous
footnote which implies that the intensive wedge is independent of age.
35It can be shown from (13) that v0(lt()) tends to 0 as  tends to 0 and, hence, from (23),  i(; t)
tends to 1 as  tends to 0.
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Figure 7: Intensive and extensive wedges as a function of the productivity index 
5.3 Decomposition of the Social Welfare Gains
By construction, the optimal redistribution policy improves social welfare compared to
the no-redistribution benchmark. Although this redistribution policy decreases GDP by
9.5%, it generates a consumption equivalent social welfare gain of 7.7%, i.e. the level of
social welfare is identical in the optimal redistribution policy as in the no-redistribution
benchmark with the consumption of all agents increased by 7.7%.
The welfare of an individual depends on both his consumption level and his labor
supply. Hence, it would be interesting to decompose the social welfare gain from the
optimal policy into four components: a consumption component and three labor supply
components corresponding, respectively, to the intensive margin, the extensive margin
and an interaction between the two. This is what I do in this subsection.
The welfare of an -worker under the optimal policy is given by:
V () =
Z H
0
e tu(c())dt 
Z R()
0
e t [v (lt()) + b] dt; (50)
while, under the no-redistribution benchmark, it is equal to:
~V () =
Z H
0
e tu(~c(1))dt 
Z ~R
0
e t
h
v

~lt

+ b
i
dt. (51)
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Hence, the welfare gain of an -worker can be written as:
V ()  ~V () =
Z H
0
e t [u(c())  u(~c(1))] dt (52)
 
Z ~R
0
e t
h
v(lt())  v

~lt
i
dt
 
Z R()
~R
e t
h
v

~lt

+ b
i
dt
 
Z R()
~R
e t
h
v(lt())  v

~lt
i
dt,
which decomposes the welfare gain into a consumption component, an intensive compo-
nent, an extensive component and an interaction component, respectively.36 To obtain
the social welfare gain from the optimal policy, it is necessary to aggregate these compo-
nents over the whole population, i.e. over the whole distribution of .
Figure 8 displays the welfare gain generated by each component and for each type 
of worker. Thus, each curve corresponds to one of the four components of (52) multiplied
by the mass f() of -workers to whom it applies. It follows that the social welfare gain
from the optimal policy is equal to the sum of the areas37 under these four curves.
Figure 8 shows that most low productivity workers gain more from redistribution
through an earlier retirement age than through a higher consumption level. For high
productivity workers, lower consumption is a signicant source of welfare loss. This
is not surprising since GDP is lower and, moreover, the distribution of consumption
across the population is more equal. Almost all workers benet from a reduction of
their labor supply along the intensive margin. Finally, to understand why the interaction
component is negative for low productivity workers, note that they retire earlier thanks
to the redistribution policy but, if they did participate until ~R, they would have supplied
less labor during those years than under the no-redistribution benchmark. In other words,
the interaction component corrects for the fact that the intensive component reports a
large gain for these workers even though some them never participate.
Aggregating these four components reveals that 50.9% of the population, those with
 < 0:82, gain from redistribution; while the others prefer the no-redistribution bench-
mark. The social welfare gain from redistribution can be broken down into the four com-
ponents by integrating (52) over the whole population. Equivalently, the contribution of
each component is proportional to the area under the corresponding curve of Figure 8.
36Note that, to compute some of these components, it is necessary to rely on counterfactual values of
labor supply along the intensive margin, i.e. values of lt() for t > R() and ~lt for t > ~R, which can
nevertheless be computed from the rst-order conditions (13) and (44). Alternatively, to avoid relying on
these values, it is possible to merge the interaction term with the intensive component when R() < ~R
and with the extensive component when R() > ~R.
37The area is negative when the curve is below the horizontal axis.
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Figure 8: Decomposition of the Social Welfare Gains from the Optimal Policy
Table 1 reports the consumption equivalent social welfare gain from the optimal policy
as well as its decomposition into the four components.
Table1: Decomposition of the social welfare gain from the optimal policy
GDP Welfare Breakdown
loss gain Consumption Intensive Extensive Interaction
 = 0:5 9.5% 7.7% -86.7% 182.3% 15.1% -10.7%
 = 0:25 8.2% 11.2% -8.0% 95.1% 19.7% -6.8
 = 0 1.1% 29.2% 64.1% 0% 35.9% 0%
Interestingly, when  = 0:5, the social welfare gain generated by the optimal policy is
not due to a preferred allocation of consumption, but to a welfare enhancing reduction
of labor supply, especially along the intensive margin. Not only does the consumption
allocation not increase social welfare, in fact it lowers welfare signicantly: the more equal
distribution of consumption across the population does not compensate for the lower level
of output.
Decreasing the intensive elasticity  of labor supply relaxes the incentive compatibility
constraint, which leads to a smaller drop of output and a larger social welfare gain
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generated by the optimal policy. Recall that, in the extreme case where  = 0, the only
dimension of labor supply, i.e. the retirement age, is observable by the government, which
simplies the incentive compatibility constraint to V 0() = 0. The smaller drop in output
leads to a larger consumption component. Also, when  is low, it is easier to induce high
skilled agents to produce a high level of output,38 which allows the government to further
reduce the retirement age of low skilled workers such as to raise their welfare. This
increases the extensive component while maintaining GDP nearly constant.
In the absence of public expenditures, i.e. E = 0, and with  = 0:5, the implementa-
tion of the optimal policy induces a much larger drop in output, equal to 19.9% of GDP,
and it generates a social welfare gain of 14.0% of consumption. The magnitude of the
extensive component increases to 97.1% while that of the intensive component reduces to
135.8%. The consumption component is equal to -100.9% and the interaction component
to -32.1%. Thus, when there is no need to nance any government expenditures, the plan-
ner relies much more extensively on the retirement age in order to redistribute welfare to
the low skilled. Indeed, in the corresponding optimal allocation, 26.5% of the workforce
retires before age 60, which includes 8.1% of the population who never participate.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, I have characterized the optimal redistribution policy in a life-cycle frame-
work with both an intensive and an extensive margin of labor supply. My results advocate
for the implementation of a history-dependent social security system which induces a pos-
itive correlation between the productivity of workers and their retirement age. Thus, a
substantial amount of redistribution should be done within the social security system.
In many industrialized countries, a looming pension crisis makes it necessary to in-
crease the average retirement age. This creates a unique opportunity to reform social
security systems and my work suggests that, rather than imposing an homogeneous in-
crease in career length across the population, a well designed reform should encourage
higher productivity people to retire later.
For simplicity, I have assumed that the xed cost of working remains constant through-
out the life of an individual. However, my analysis implies that if a worker, such as a
mother of young children, faces a high xed cost of working over a few years, then she
should take some time o¤ during those years.39 This policy recommendation is very
di¤erent from that implied by a corresponding static analysis of optimal redistribution
with an extensive margin which would advocate for the implementation of a tax credit to
38When  = 0:5, switching from the no-redistribution benchmark to the optimal policy increases the
lifetime production of only 3.9% of workers, those with  > 2:55; while, when  = 0, the optimal policy
increases the lifetime production of 51.5% of workers, those with  > 0:79.
39Of course, my analysis abstracts from human capital considerations.
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induce that person to work. Hence, further research on the precise nature of the extensive
margin of labor supply could have dramatic consequences for policy recommendations.
Another promising avenue for further research is the introduction of skill risks within
the framework of this paper. In particular, some high productivity workers might become
unable to have long careers. Thus, allowing for the random occurrence of permanent
disability shocks, as in Diamond Mirrlees (1978), seems particularly relevant for the
optimal design of social security.
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A Proof of Lemma 3
Integrating the optimality conditions for the multipliers, given by (15), yields:
() =
Z 


	0(V (x))  
u0(c(x)

f(x)dx. (A1)
Let us dene:
D() =
1
1  F ()
Z 

	0(V (x))f(x)dx, (A2)
where F () =
R 
0
f(x)dx; and:
E() =
1
1  F ()
Z 

f(x)
u0(c(x))
dx. (A3)
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Thus, (A1) could be written as:
() = [1  F ()] [D()  E()] . (A4)
We know, by (15), that (0) = 0. Hence:
 =
D(0)
E(0)
. (A5)
Substituting this value into (A4) yields:
() = [1  F ()]E()

D()
E()
  D(0)
E(0)

. (A6)
Let us now show that D() is non-increasing in , while E() is non-decreasing in .
Di¤erentiating (A2) gives:
D0() =
 	0(V ())f() [1  F ()] + f() R 

	0(V (x))f(x)dx
[1  F ()]2 ,
=
f()
[1  F ()]2
Z 

[	0(V (x)) 	0(V ())] f(x)dx  0. (A7)
The main bracket of the integral cannot be positive since 	00(:)  0 and, by the incentive
compatibility constraint (9), V (x)  V () if x > . Di¤erentiating (A3) yields:
E 0() =
1
[1  F ()]2
  f()
u0(c())
[1  F ()] + f()
Z 

f(x)
u0(c(x))
dx

,
=
f()
[1  F ()]2
Z 


1
u0(c(x))
  1
u0(c())

f(x)dx  0. (A8)
This derivative is non-negative since u00(:) < 0 and c(x)  c() if x > , where this
last inequality follows from the rst-order condition V1(; ) = 0, which could be written
explicitly by di¤erentiating (2), together with the su¢ cient condition of Lemma 1. These
results imply that the ratio D()=E() is non-increasing in . Hence, by (A6), we must
have ()  0.
We can now use this result to prove the slightly stronger result that () < 0 for
all  2 (0; ). Let us assume for a contradiction that there exists an ~ <  such that
c(~) = c(). As c(:) cannot be decreasing, we must have c() = c() for all  2 [~; ^].
This implies, by V1(; ) = 0, dyt()=d  0 and dR()=d  0, that we must also have
yt() = yt() and R() = R() for all  2 [~; ^], i.e. there is bunching at the top. Note
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that () = 0 implies, by (13), that:
t() =
v0(lt())
u0(c())
. (A9)
We have:
t(~) 
v0(lt(~))
u0(c(~))
= t(~) 
v0(lt(~))
u0(c())
,
= t(~) 
v0(lt(~))
v0(lt())
t(), (A10)
where the rst line follows from c(~) = c() and the second from (A9). Note that:
v0(lt(~)) = v0

yt(~)
t(~)

= v0

yt()
t(~)

 v0

yt()
t()

= v0(lt()), (A11)
where the inequality is strict for the values of t 2 [0; R()) such that t() < t() for all
 < . It follows from (A10) and (A11) that, for some values of t 2 [0; R()), we have:
t(~) 
v0(lt(~))
u0(c(~))
< t(~)  t() < 0. (A12)
But, this together with (~)  0 is inconsistent with (13) evaluated at ~. Hence, there
is no bunching at the top and c() < c() for all  < . The consumption function
c(:) being continuous, this implies, by (A8), that E 0() > 0 for all  < . Thus, the
ratio D()=E() is strictly decreasing in  and, by (A6), we must have () < 0 for all
 2 (0; ).40
40Note that, even if the su¢ cient condition of Lemma 1 does not hold, Lemma 3 remains true provided
that consumption is weakly increasing in the productivity index and that it is strictly increasing at the
top of the distribution.
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